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FM USDEL SECRETARY
TO RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARTO 000001

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/26
TAGS: [OVIP](#) [RICE](#) [CONDOLEEZZA](#) [PREL](#) [MY](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Rice's July 27, 2006 conversation
with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah

PARTO 00000001 001.2 OF 004

(U) Classified by: Arnold Chacon, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(b) and

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(d)

[1](#)1. (U) July 27, 2006; 4:45 PM; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

[1](#)2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Secretary
Amb. Christopher J. LaFleur
U/S Karen Hughes
A/S Chris Hill
NSC Senior Director Dennis Wilder

Malaysia
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi
Foreign Minister Hamid
Amb. Rajmah Hussein
MFA Deputy Secretary General I Othman Hashim
Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime
Minister

[1](#)3. (C) Summary: The Secretary reviewed her efforts to
achieve a ceasefire in Lebanon based on a more stable,
permanent solution to the crisis. Prime Minister Abdullah
expressed disappointment with the results of the Rome
Conference and urged the U.S. pressure Israel to implement
a cease fire. He welcomed efforts to shape a peacekeeping
force and reiterated Malaysia's offer to send Malaysian
peacekeepers. In a broader discussion of the Palestinian
issue, Prime Minister Abdullah said he thought that Hamas
could be persuaded to support a two state solution but not
while they were fighting. They agreed that "we could not
lose" Abu Mazen. The Secretary concluded that some
movement had been achieved on Lebanon and the
international community needed Malaysia's support to
strengthen the chances that a ceasefire would be approved
by both sides. End Summary.

[1](#)4. (C) The Secretary reviewed the results of her recent
discussions in Beirut, Jerusalem and Rome. In
conversations with both sides, she had assessed the
situation and discussed possible bases for a ceasefire.
She left NSC Middle East Senior Director Abrams and
Assistant Secretary Welch behind in the region to continue
discussions.

[1](#)5. (C) Abdullah said he had been disappointed that the
Rome Conference couldn't agree to call for an immediate
ceasefire. The Secretary said that this was something on
which the parties to the conflict themselves had to agree.
Abdullah asked whether she thought the Lebanese didn't

want a ceasefire. The Secretary said it was not clear if Hezbollah wanted one. Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora was not able to extend his authority into the southern part of the country. We did not want simply to return to the previous situation. Abdullah said Siniora had told him he wanted a ceasefire. Siniora was suggesting there be a simultaneous return of the two prisoners and a ceasefire monitored by the UN. The European Union could also participate and Malaysia was prepared to send peacekeepers.

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¶16. (C) The Secretary said the way out of the crisis was to make sure there was a more stable, permanent solution. The Government of Lebanon should be able to send its army south with a UN mandate and an international stability force. Hezbollah had to be moved far enough back from the border so that it couldn't fire rockets into Israel. When Hezbollah crossed the border to capture the two Israeli soldiers, it had also started firing rockets into Israel. Israel wanted to eliminate that threat; it had no other reason to be in Lebanon. We wanted to see a ceasefire but that required that the circumstances on the ground wouldn't lead to more attacks. We hoped to see international support for Siniora to extend the Lebanese government's authority to the south.

¶17. (C) Abdullah asked whether a ceasefire was dependent on deployment of international forces. The Secretary said the key was to get a mandate for the force. Abdullah said he hoped we would not veto a ceasefire. The Secretary replied that, on the contrary, this was our proposal. It was one thing to make statements, another to actually get the fighting stopped. We can't just talk about it, we have to do it, she said.

¶18. (C) Abdullah said the US had the strength to bring about a ceasefire, and Israel would have to go along. He hoped the US could wield its power to stop the war. The situation had become very bad. He had talked to Siniora, who confirmed that the situation was very bad. He had also talked to Indonesian President Yudoyono. Indonesia and Malaysia were not anti-US, but they believed that a ceasefire would occur if the US wanted one. News that the US was selling smart bombs to Israel made the public even more angry about the US role. On the one hand, the US was vetoing a ceasefire; on the other hand it was sending smart bombs.

¶19. (C) The Secretary said the US had not vetoed a ceasefire. She reminded Abdullah that this crisis had started with Hezbollah shelling of Israel. Israel must be convinced that Hezbollah won't be able to continue doing this. This was why an international force was needed. She noted that Siniora also didn't want continuation of the current situation in which Hezbollah could plunge Lebanon into war at any time. She knew it was difficult to see the photographs of the destruction in Lebanon. It would be helpful if other parties in the Islamic world would help Hezbollah recognize that they must accept a ceasefire and dissuade the Iranians from interfering. The long-range missiles that Hezbollah were firing came from Iran. We hoped that everyone could use our its offices to rein in the extreme elements.

¶10. (C) Abdullah said Hezbollah was a manifestation of the same problem as the Palestinian crisis. There was anger there also over Israel's illegal walls and borders and atrocities against Palestinians. The Secretary replied that PA President Abbas had told her the Palestinians didn't need Hezbollah to defend them. Abdullah said Abbas must succeed. But if nothing happened [to advance the Palestinian cause] he would be in trouble himself. He recalled President Bush telling him that he supported the Palestinians people's right to choose their

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organization and that US officials were legally barred from working with them. However, all Hamas had to do was to renounce terrorism and commit to the peace process. Abdullah said that we should engage with them first, and then they could change.

¶11. (C) The Secretary said that part of the problem was that the Hamas leadership was divided between those in Damascus and those in Palestine. Haniya may want to do some things, but he doesn't control the military. He tells others that he doesn't know what Hamas' military is doing. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult for their government to function. However, if Hamas accepted the Quartet principles, there would not be a problem. But we could not have a peace process if one of the parties doesn't accept peace as the objective.

¶12. (C) Abdullah thought that Hamas could come to terms with a two state solution. They would be happy to secure a solution after years of fighting. But if we put too much pressure on them, they would react negatively. He wanted to help Abbas. But the Palestinian government couldn't function without money. The Secretary responded that she was Abbas's chief fundraiser, noting our efforts to get other governments to live up to their aid pledges. We had been doing everything we could to assist him. Abdullah said the problem was that this was not the perception. He stressed that we could not lose Abbas. The Secretary agreed.

¶13. (C) Returning to the Lebanon crisis, the Secretary said that we were making progress step by step. We needed help from others as well, especially countries such as Malaysia, to strengthen the chances that a ceasefire would be approved by both sides.

RICE

would be embarrassed if its draft Resolution on North Korea lingered in the Security Council while a Resolution on Iran moved forward. The Secretary noted that China and Russia might be

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convinced to abstain on a North Korea resolution. The period before the G-8 presented a good opportunity in the Security Council to act. France supports Japan's draft resolution by believes that it will be a good idea not to force a vote on it. France would like to come to a consensus on North Korea and agreed that the period before the G-8 was the best time to

convince the Russians and Chinese not to veto
Japan's resolution.

IRAQ

¶11. (S) The Secretary urged Douste-Blazy to consider the Iraq Compact, which entails serious commitments by the Iraqi government. Douste-Blazy said France "noted with pleasure" that the Iraqi government was much more inclusive than in the past, and France is ready to help. Still, Douste-Blazy said he was preoccupied by the daily violence, by the corruption, and by the need for Iraq to create public services. He emphasized the importance of a regional meeting

on Iraq that would include the Arab League and countries such as Russia and Turkey. The Secretary said it was important to include these

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countries, but that the international community should first concentrate on the Iraq Compact. Douste-Blazy said France had worked with Iraq on its debt and on training civil servants, police and officials in the justice sector. The Secretary urged Douste-Blazy to consider

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infrastructure projects, given Iraq's great need in this area. Douste-Blazy said that if the Iraqi government made a specific request, France would certainly consider it. Still, he said France was reticent because of past experiences in Iraqi mismanagement of assistance funds, and because of the security situation.

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